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Aid "Specifically Directed" to Facilitate War Crimes:
The ICTY's Anomalous Actus Reus Standard for Aiding
and Abetting
Christopher P. Eby*

Abstract
The question of whether internationalcriminallaw sweeps too wide in a globaliZed world
is dramatizedin the context ofaccomplice liability, where aiding and abetting may embrace many
forms of culpable activiy-including even "encouragement." To the extent that modern
industriali!edstates legitimiZe the United Nations, their defense industries andgoods exporters
would likely prefer culpability standards excluding their activity altogetherfrom the universe of
compliciy (in crimes against humanity, genocide, and the like). Until recently, there was little
doubt that internationalcriminaltribunals operating under the aegis of the UN hadyielded no
such bright line formulations. Provided they knew their assistance would be used ultimatey to
commit crimes against civilians, allpurveyors whose assistance contributed meaningfuly can be
convicted as accomplices. Nevertheless, 2013 witnessedaphenomenon in thejurisprudenceof one
such tribunalthat reflected the impliitpull these argumentspossess.Adopting the dictum of its
predecessor appellate court, the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) derivedfrom customaU internationallaw a culpabilityformulationfor the actus reus of
aiding and abetting: that the accused's acts of assistance be "specfically directed" to facilitate
commission of one of the crimes punishable under the ICTY Statute. As the phrase connotes,
and as subsequent interpretationscrstalli.edit, specific direction limits whatforms of activity
can be criminal-et with a peculiar limiting prinple in cases where the accused operated
geographicalynearto the princial.This Comment will ague thatspecific direction is inconsistent
with ICTY precedentand customay internationallaw, that it callsfor assumptions at odds with
governing treades, and that its potentialnormative merits cannot miirgate these critiques.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2013, the International Criminal Tribunal for Crimes Committed in
the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") acquitted two former heads of the Serbian State
Security Service of aiding and abetting the war crimes of, as well as conspiring
with, a special unit of the Serbian State Security Service known as the Red Berets.'
The defendants, Simatovic and Staiiic, interacted with a contingent of the
Serbian Volunteer Guard known as Arkan's men-training, supplying, and
financing them under continuous communication with Slobodan Milosevic. 2 In
separate proceedings, the Trial Chamber found the Red Berets, Arkan's men,
Milesovic, and members of the Bosnian Serb Army guilty of crimes against
humanity for participation both in the murder and persecution of non-Serbs and
in their deportation and forcible transfer from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.'
Yet it acquitted Simatovi6 and Staniiic despite their elite status within the Serbian
security apparatus, their establishment and operation of a Red Beret training
camp, and evidence that Stanific, assuring Simatovik, said "we'll exterminate them
completely."'
To arrive at this result, the ICTY invoked a sui generis requirement that the
prosecution prove the accused's acts of assistance were "specificaly directed towards
charged crimes."' In other words, the ICTY announced a shift away from
presuming actus reus when acts of assistance substantially contributed to a crime's
commission (with the attendant burden on the defendant(s) to rebut the
presumption), to requiring that the prosecution prove the acts of assistance
themselves tend only or predominantly to effectuate the crimes in question. The
ultimate effect was to decriminalize entire categories of conduct-making proof
of actus reus non-consequentialist and importing a further "intent" requirement
as to the acts themselves.' Indeed, one prominent peer tribunal expressed alarm
I

The Red Berets were responsible for many of the worst atrocities at Srebrenica and Sarajevo. Facts
drawn from Prosecutor v. Stanigi and Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Trial judgment (May 30,
2013) [hereinafter Staniii judgment]. All documents and cases of the ICTY cited herein are
available at its website, http://www.icty.org (last visited May 8, 2014).

2

For an in-depth study of Arkan and his volunteer army, see CHRISTOPHER S. STEWART, HUNTING
THE TIGER: THE FAST LIFE AND VIOLENT DEATH OF THE BALKANS' MOST DANGEROUS MAN

(Thomas Dunne Books, 1st ed. 2008).

3

Staniii Judgment, supra note 1.

4

Stanigic quoted in Eric Gordy, What Happened to the Hague Tribunal?, N.Y. TIMEs (June 2, 2013),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/opinion/global/what-happened-to-the-haguetribunal.html (last visited May 3, 2014).

5

Stanitic Judgment, supranote 1, 11264 (emphasis added).

6

One commentator posited that the ICTY's new standard would have acquitted the Zyklon B
defendants, who sold to S.S. functionaries poisonous gas used to commit genocide during the
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at the ICTY's novel formulation, rebutting it with the language of the Rome
Statute:' "the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability under Article 6(1) of the
[Rome] Statute and customary international law is that the accused's acts and
conduct of assistance, encouragement, and/or moral support had a substantial
effect on the commission of each charged crime for which he is to be held
responsible."'
This Comment argues that the ICTY's jurisprudence in this and its
predecessor case is at odds with the weight of its own precedent, as well as that of
its peer tribunals, and likely contravenes generally accepted principles of
customary law governing UN Security Council tribunals. Section II of this
Comment outlines the background and development of the specific direction
standard, tracking the emergence of the phrase as dictum through its adoption by
the ICTY as binding law. Section III examines whether the standard is consistent
with international law principles and precedent (whether customary or treatyderived), arguing ultimately that it marks a vivid departure from them. Section IV
then explores whether justifications for limiting the actus reus of accomplice
liability-such as insulating from vast liabilities large bureaucratic nations that
transfer weapons, materials, and other goods to unstable states or factionsoutweigh harms imposed on international efforts to police and prosecute
violators. While such a conclusion might seem to depend on operating
assumptions about the worthiness of certain forms of international trade, this
Section argues that concerns of legal efficacy, institutional competence, and the
continued proliferation of the bureaucratic state militate against accepting the
standard as a normative matter. Section V concludes with a call for sustained
scrutiny of specific direction or reconsideration of the decision at the heart of the
controversy, and with the realization that, going forward, guidance from The
Hague as to the authority tribunals are to accord one another's decisional law
would alleviate the underlying jurisprudential problem.

Holocaust. See James G. Stewart, Comments to Kevin Jon Heller, More Misdirecon on Specfic
Direction, OPINIOJUIuS (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:39 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-postthe-icty-loses-its-way-on-complicity-part-1 (last visited April 26, 2014); see also this paper's
discussion, infra.
7

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference on
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, 21, art. 17 [hereinafter Rome Statute].

8

Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A,
[hereinafter Taylor Appeals Judgment].

Summer 2014

259

Appeals Judgment, T 481 (Sept. 26, 2013)

Chicagojournalof InternationalI aw

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC DIRECTION
In a recent line of cases, the ICTY derived from international humanitarian
law, applied in the case before it, and adopted as binding, a proof requirement
effectively limiting as a matter of law the sorts of activities that can aid and abet
genocide, a war crime, or crime against humanity. A United Nations court tasked
with prosecuting crimes that occurred in the Balkans during the 1990s, the ICTY
proceeds on the basis of universal jurisdiction.' Established with unanimous
approval of the United Nations Security Council," the tribunal garnered the early
support of many academics who thought it would enhance the credibility and
effectiveness of international law." As with the ICTY's sister tribunals-the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR")12 and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone ("SCSL")"-the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN
Charter to address the threat to international security posed by widespread ethnic
cleansings, mass killings, and forcible transfer in the region.14 These tribunals'
operating statutes, although identical in most respects, contain enough variance to
allow them to approach certain crimes differently."
Crucially, however, all three statutes contain the same accomplice liability
language and incorporate customary international law, opting for a suggestionand-adoption regime under which judges are to consider proposals submitted
9

See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanities Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, adopted May 25, 1993, as amended by S.C. Res. 1660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 660 (Feb. 28,
2006), UN Doc. S/25705, art. 9.2 (providing that the tribunal may formally request that national
courts defer to its competence) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].

'o

See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 art. 1, (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter Resolution 827].

11

See, for example, Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International
Law, 88 Am. J. INT'L. L. 76, 78-79 (1994).

12

See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted Nov. 8, 1994, as amended by
U.N.S.C. Res. 1431, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1431 (Aug. 14, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 [hereinafter
ICTR Statute].

13

See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138, 145; Resolution 1315
S/RES/1315 (August 14, 2000) [hereinafter SCSL Statute].

14

Id

15

The ICTY has shown a willingness to proscribe offenses without reference to
existing authority,
whereas the ICTR tends to interpret expansively treaty-based definitions of war crimes and the like.
Compare,forinstance, ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 4 (referring to "rape, enforced prostitution and
any form of sexual assault" as violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention), with ICTY Statute,
supra note 9, art. 5(g) (refraining from classifying rape as a violation of the Geneva Convention, but
defining it as a crime against humanity). The SCSL, on the other hand, has the unique authority to
prosecute individuals for violations of Sierra Leonean law. See SCSL Statute, snpra note 13, art. 5.
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from UN member nations on evidentiary standards and substantive crime
definition." Judges are not, however, instructed to adopt particular proposals,
which predominantly come from individuals advocating criminalization of entire
categories of conduct, not scholars proposing causation axioms or appropriate
standards of culpability." If ICTY judges choose not to adopt, say, Serbia's
suggestion to incorporate its national criminal law standards into the tribunal's
war crimes prosecutions, then the tribunal is left with recourse only to treaty
principles, its own case law, and customary law-including the particularly
relevant decisions of its peer tribunals. One anomalous holding might come to
have far greater precedential significance than it would in the context of a
comprehensive statute with which decisional law must comport.
8
A. Prosecutor v. Tadil1

Dus'ko Tadic was the president of the Kozarac board of the Serb Democratic
Party, yet his involvement in the commission of atrocities was not purely
bureaucratic. During an attack on Kozarac, located in what is now Bosnia and
Herzegovina, he participated in the collection and forced transfer of civilians to
detention camps; as part of a group of Serbs, he beat and kicked one victim until
he was unconscious, threatened another victim with a knife and stabbed him, and
participated in the killing of five men in Jaskii (a village near Prijedor); and he
personally killed two Muslim policemen in Kozarac in 1992.19 At trial, he was
convicted under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute on the basis of his individual
criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and
customs of war; his participation in a common design to rid the Prijedor region
of its non-Serb population constituted the actus reus. 20 Although it found that this

16

Compare Resolution 827, supra note 10, 1 3 (requiring "the Secretary-General submit to the judges
of the International Tribunal, upon their election, any suggestions received from States for the rules
of procedure and evidence called for in Article 15" of the statute), with ICTY Statute, supra note 9,
art. 15 (providing that judges shall "adopt rules of procedure and evidence ... and other appropriate
matters").

J. Goldstone, ProsecutingRape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 277,
280 (2002) (describing being "inundated" with letters from "many people, and particularly women"
in the "United States, Canada, and many of the western European nations" who took "the trouble
to put into their own words . . . their concern about rape being either ignored once again or not
receiving adequate attention from the Tribunal").

17

See The Hon. Richard

18

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment (uly 15, 1999) [hereinafter
Tadic Appeals Judgment].

19

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, $T 397, 261, 211, 389, 397 (May
7, 1997) [hereinafter Tadic Trial Judgment].

20

Id.

1 688-93, 714.
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common purpose of forcible transfer and deportation of non-Serbs did not
include intent to commit murder-largely because the initial takeover of the
region had been bloodless-the Trial Chamber held that, at the very least, Tadic
was complicit in the murders, since "aiding and abetting includes all acts of
assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as the
requisite intent is present."2 1
The Appeals Chamber added nine counts of principal violation, declined to
follow the lower court's aiding and abetting analysis, and opted instead to find
Tadit guilty on grounds of conspiracy (or joint criminal enterprise). This gave the
tribunal the chance to distinguish acting in pursuance of a common purpose or
design (used interchangeably with conspiracy) from aiding and abetting.22 It was
clear to the court that Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, which holds aiders and
abettors criminally responsible as individuals, was designed to criminalize a broad
swath of conduct beyond physical perpetration of the actus reus. The nature of
many international crimes committed in wartime dictated this realization,
particularly in the absence of guidance as to what conduct is within the reach of
accomplice liability.23 "To hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person
who materially performs the criminal act would disregard the role as coperpetrators all those who in some way made itpossible for the perpetrator physically to
carry out that criminal act."24 Indeed, the court went on to state, "international
criminal rules on common purpose are substantially rooted in, and to a large extent
reflect, the position taken by many States of the world in their national legal
systems."2 The Appeals Chamber in TadiW, therefore, sought at the outset to
construe broadly the portion of the statute concerning derivative liability, which
makes no distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abetting, but what
followed was a wholesale retreat from these first principles.
Recognizing that "the Tribunal's Statute does not specify (either expressly
or by implication) the objective and subjective elements (actus reus and mens rea)
of this category of collective criminality," the Appeals Chamber proceeded to
identify them.26 It observed that the notion of common purpose or joint criminal
21

Id. IT 689, 688, 691 (finding also that assistance is "substantial" if the accused's acts were a but-for
cause of the commission of the crime(s) and that "actual physical presence when the crime is
committed is not necessary").

22

Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 18, T 191.

2

See id.

24

Id. 192 (emphasis added).

2s

Id. 193.

26

Id.

194 ("Customary rules on this matter are discernible on the basis of various elements: chiefly
case law and a few instances of international legislation.").
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enterprise under customary international law could be found in three distinct
categories of cases: those where all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common
design, shared the same criminal intention or mens rea to perpetrate a crime;
concentration camp cases, with the accused's position of authority within the
camp hierarchy and knowledge of the perpetration of crimes therein satisfying
actus reus and mens rea, respectively; and, finally, those cases where co-defendants
shared a common design or purpose, and one of the perpetrators committed a
crime that, while outside the scope of this design, was nevertheless a natural and
foreseeable result of it.27 It was this last category into which Tadic fell, and
"criminal responsibility may be imputed to all participants within the common
enterprise where the risk of death occurring was both a predictable consequence
of the execution of the common design and the accused was either reckless or
indifferent to that risk." 28 The Trial Chamber, by implication, did not need
complicity to hold Tadic responsible for crimes outside the common design,
because of the foreseeability of the murders within the context of the forced
transfer conspiracy.
Had the Tadi court stopped here, the course of subsequent cases may have
been quite different. Yet the court decided not only to clarify the doctrine of
conspiracy but to contrast it with aiding and abetting liability, announcing in
dictum:
In the case of aiding and abetting ... the principal may not even know about
the accomplice's contribution. The aider and abettor carries out acts rpecicaly
directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a
certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton
destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantialeffect
upon the perpetration of the crime. By contrast, in the case of acting in
pursuance of a common purpose or design, it is sufficient for the participant
to perform acts that in some way are directed to furthering the common plan
or purpose. In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is
knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the
commission of a specific crime by the principal. By contrast, in the case of
common purpose or design more is required ([for example], either intent to
perpetrate the crime or intent to pursue the common criminal design plus
29
foresight that those crimes . . . were likely to be committed).

In other words, the court sought to make it much more difficult for the
prosecution to prove the actus reus of aiding and abetting than of conspiracy;
whereas an accomplice's acts must be specifically directed to assist a perpetrator
27

See id.% 195-220 (citing case law from British, Italian, and US jurisdictions for the proposition that
"the notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability is firmly established in customary
international law and in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly, in the Statute of the International
Tribunal").

28

Id. 204.

29

Id. 229 (emphasis added).
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and have a substantial effect, a conspirator's need only be "in some way
directed" to furthering the conspiracy. The discriminating reader of Tadilis left
with the following doctrinal matrix:

Tadi
Conspiracy
(or joint
criminal
enterprise)

Actus reus
Aid or acts of assistance
provided need only be of a
type that sometimes
accompanies the commission
of the crime.

Aiding and
abetting

Aid or acts of assistance must
have a substantial effect on
the perpetration of the crime
AND must be of a type that
accompanies, or is
"specifically directed
towards," commission of the
particular crime.

Mens rea
(a) specific intent to
perpetrate the principal's
crime; OR
(b) intent to pursue the
common criminal design and
"foresight" that crimes
outside its scope were "likely"
to follow.
Knowledge that acts of
assistance indeed assist the
principal's commission of the
crime.

This seems the only reading of Tadi that preserves mens rea and actus reus
as distinct concepts and proof elements; indeed, one could interpret specific
direction as collapsing them into one and remain faithful to the opinion. There
are certainly good arguments on both sides of the mens rea debate;30 but the actus
reus prescriptions in Tadid would almost certainly be under-inclusive-sweeping
in only conduct that the relevant observer would associate with ICTY-punishable
crimes ostensibly without regardtofactual context or circumstances. The language of the
opinion suggests that, if a given act has a plausible, non-criminal explanation, it
would be insulated as a basis for accomplice liability, regardless of the
substantiality of its effect on the commission of a war crime. Implicitly realizing
this, the court subsequently attempted to square the novel Tadi doctrine with
precedent.

30

See generalyDoug Cassel, CorporateAidingandAbettingofHumanRigbts Violations: Confusion in the Courts,
6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HuM. RTs. 304 (2008) (arguing that, while aiding and abetting liability for
corporate entities has long carried an actus reus of "substantial assistance," there is little case law
on point consistently selecting a mens rea standard as between purpose and knowledge).
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B. Prosecutor v. Blagojevii3 '
Several years after it heard Tadi, the Appeals Chamber considered the
conviction of Blagojevic, a commander of the Bosnian Serb Army ("VRS"), for
aiding and abetting genocide and crimes against humanity. His role in the events
surrounding the infamous Srebrenica massacre32 was one of oversight and
instruction: he supervised the forced transfer of refugees by members of his
brigade and coordinated such efforts against Muslim Serbs.33 The Trial Chamber
held expressly that aiding and abetting, not conspiracy, was the appropriate theory
under both Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute governing individual criminal
responsibility and the command responsibility provisions of Article 7(3).34 Finding
that Blagojevic rendered substantial assistance to the primary perpetrators, the
Trial Chamber convicted him of aiding and abetting genocide, despite the
prosecution's failure to establish that he had knowledge of the executions (at
Srebrenica) when he rendered assistance.3 5 However, because he undoubtedly had
knowledge of his inferiors' "cruel and inhumane" acts towards and torture of the
refugees, and because his assistance was "practical," the Trial Chamber agreed that
genocidal intent could be inferred from evidence of other culpable acts
systematically targeting the same group. 36 Grounding its conviction in "general
principles of criminal law," the Trial Chamber made explicit its past and present
recourse to definitions of complicity prevailing in "France, England, and
Germany."
The Appeals Chamber nonetheless took the view that no trier of fact could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that, without knowledge of the mass killings,
BlagojeviCs awareness of the other facts relating to the forcible transfer operation
31

Prosecutor v. Blagojevid and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Appeals Judgment (May 9, 2007)
[hereinafter Blagojevic Appeals Judgment].

32

For a book-length study of the Srebrenica Massacre, see DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE
BETRAYALAND FALLOF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR 11 (1998).
For scholarly articles, see H. Brunborg, T.H. Lyngstad & H. Urdal, Accouningfor Genocide:How Many
Were Killed in Srebrenica?, 19 EUR. J. OF POPULATION 229 (2003); Jasmina Besirevic Regan, Genodde
Studies Program: Former Yugoslavia, YALE UNIV. ONLINE (retrieved Mar. 16, 2008), http://yale.
edu/gsp/former-yugoslavia/index.html.

33

See generaly Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, TrialJudgment (an. 17, 2005)
[hereinafter Blagojevid Trial judgment].

34

Id.

35

BlagojeviC Appeals Judgment, supra note 31,

1123

36

Blagojevid Trial Judgment, supra note 33,

755-59.

37

Id. 1 776 & n.2208 (looking even to Chinese and Argentinian law after endorsing the proposition
that applicable complicity law in the ICTY ought to reflect developed-world jurisprudence).

f 682-83.
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satisfied the mens rea for complicity in genocide." The fact of his command
responsibility did not override the necessity of proving his particular mens rea
(knowledge) concerning the acts themselves. In the portion of the opinion most
germane for our purposes, the court addressed the confusion Tadid had
engendered:
[W]hile the Tadic definition has not been explicitly departed from, specific
direction has not always been included as an element of the actus reus of
aiding and abetting. This may be explained by the fact that such a finding will
often be implicit where the accused has provided practical assistance to the
principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the commission of the
crime .... [T]he fact that his or her participation amounted to no more than
his or her "routine duties" will not exculpate the accused. 39
Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that specific direction ought not constitute the
focus, because, far from a stand-alone proof requirement, it had effectively served
as a proxy for practical assistance having a substantial effect on commission of
the crime. Indeed, Blagojedi seems to harmonize with the weight of customary law,
just as it explains subsequent decisions (such as Prosecutorv. Brdanin)40 in which
specific direction played no part in upholding convictions for aiding and abetting
detention camp killings.
Echoing Western principles of complicity and declaring substantiality of aid
the lodestar, the Appeals Chamber in Brdanin held that "Brdanin's inactivity and
openly laisse5jaireattitude towards the camps and detention facilities, coupled with
his failure 'to take a stand' against the events in the camps, had a substantial effect
on the commission of torture, and, as a result, encouraged and supported the
perpetrators of the crime."41 Inactivity and an indifferent attitude could hardly be
"specifically directed" toward facilitating the commission of detention camp
killings, precisely because that sort of (in)activity is just as suggestive of innocence
as guilt. Therein lay the problem to which the Brdanin court was responding-that
of conditioning the actus reus of complicity on some observable character of the
assistance itself.

38

See Blagojevi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 31,

39

Id 189.

40

Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judgment (April 3, 2007)
[hereinafter Brdanin Appeals Judgment]

41

Id.1 452.

1

123.
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42

The Blagojevid decision notwithstanding, specific direction conceived as an
essential element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting returned to the ICTY's
complicity jurisprudence. Perigi, a trusted V.R.S. general of Slobodan Milosevic,
was convicted at trial of aiding and abetting crimes committed in Sarajevo and
Srebrenica. The Appeals Chamber reversed his conviction on questions of lawnamely, the actus reus of aiding and abetting.43 The same judge who had presided
over the Brdanin appeal resuscitated the literal text of Tadi, but he did so with one
eye on Blagojevil. "No conviction," the Peri'iAppeals Chamber held, "for aiding
and abetting may be entered if the element of specific direction is not established
beyond reasonable doubt, either e'plicity or implicity."" At first blush, this language
might preserve Blagojevil, where an "implicit" finding of specific direction was held
to inhere whenever the accused accomplice provided to the principal practical
assistance having a substantial effect on commission of the crime. By the same
token, an "explicit" finding of specific direction might be necessary only if
assistance did not have a substantial effect (or, at the extreme end of textual
reductionism, was not "practical"). The Trial Chamber found, however, that
PerigiCs assistance did have a substantial effect on the commission of war crimes,
and, as such, it refrained from engaging in a specific direction inquiry.4 5 What
grounds, then, did the Appeals Chamber enunciate for overturning the trial court's
findings of fact?
Arguing that precedent demanded independent proof of specific direction,
the Appeals Chamber posited two potential aiding and abetting scenarios. First,
where acts of assistance were geographically proximate to the principal's acts,
proximity itself satisfies specific direction. Second, in the case of Perifil, where
assistance was not geographically proximate, the prosecution sufficiently proves
specific direction only "if the V.R.S. was an organization whose sole and exclusive
purpose was the commission of crimes," or if Peri9it "endorsed a policy of
assisting [their] crimes."46 Putting aside for now the geographic proximity test, the
court's "sole and exclusive" prong for what we might call remote assistance
42

Prosecutor v. Momcilo Perigii, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgment (Feb. 28, 2013)
[hereinafter Periik Appeals Judgment].

43

Id. 134.

44

Id. T 36 (emphasis added).

45

See Prosecutor v. Momcilo Periic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Trial Judgment, T 1627 (Sept. 6, 2011)
(finding that Periic's "logistical assistance and personnel assistance, individually and cumulatively,
had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated . . . in Sarajevo and Srebrenica") [hereinafter
Periik Trial Judgment].

46

Periii6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 42,
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preserves some distinction between mens rea and actus reus by restricting the
latter domain. The second inquiry, on the other hand, seems to combine the two
by folding "endorsement" into the actus reus-and this regardless of potential
evidentiary differences between intent as a mens rea concept and "endorsement"
as an element of the actus reus.4 Defending its novel holding, the court asserted
that "previous appeal judgments had not conducted extensive analyses of specific
direction" because "prior convictions for aiding and abetting entered or affirmed
by the Appeals Chamber involved relevant acts geographically or otherwise
proximate to, and thus not remote from, the crimes of principal perpetrators."48
The majority opinion, then, admits of two possible culpability formulations:
(a) the assisted organization or persons must not be lawful actors in any significant
sense, foreclosing convictions of those who assist criminal organizations with any
shred of legitimacy, or (b) a defendant's mental state or intent and degree of
physical assistance are equally probative on the actus reus. Judge Liu
acknowledged as much in dissent, arguing that conviction for aiding and abetting
should attain on the basis of the trial court's findings that Perigic had
institutionalized the provision of assistance; that he possessed the power to
approve or deny requests; that the assistance "sustained the very life line of the
[Bosnian Serb Army]"; that Perifik did not believe it had "another significant
source of assistance"; and that he was aware from the outset of its "propensity to
commit criminal acts."4 9
After Tadit's insertion of specific direction into ICTY complicity law, the
Blagojevilgloss, and the Appeals Chamber's judgment in Perifii, the ICTY's
complicity jurisprudence assumed the following form:

47

For instance, "endorsement" might be satisfied by evidence of general political or religious beliefs
expressed outside the events in question. Yet it should be noted that "endorsement" thus
conceptualized might well lower the threshold for probative evidence and result in over-conviction.
Surely there is a meaningful step between endorsing in theory a policy of ethnic cleansing to aiding
and abetting ethnic cleansing; but, combined with "general assistance which could be used for both
lawful and unlawful activities," such "endorsement" might sustain a conviction for aiding and
abetting war crimes by satisfying the second prong of the specific direction test for remote
assistance.

48

Perigi Appeals Judgment, supra note 42,

49

See Christopher Jenks, InternationalDecisions: Prosecutorv. PeriEi4 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 622, 623-24 &
n.1 (July 2013) (citing Periiic Appeals Judgment, supra note 42 (J. Liu, dissenting), 11 9, 7, 6 &
n.24, 8 [hereinafter Lu Dissent]).
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Actus reus
Aiding
and
abetting

Proximate Assistance
Assistance has a
substantial effect on
the perpetration of the
principal's crime, and
specific direction is
satisfied implicity, if aid
or assistance was
"geographically or
otherwise proximate
to" the crimes of the
principal(s),

D. Prosecutor

Eby

Assistance Not Geographically Proximate
Specific direction must be satisfied
explitity (1) by a finding that the aid
rendered is not "general assistance which
could be used for both lawful and
unlawful activities," but is rather of a type
that almost always attends the
commission of punishable crimes; OR (2)
where aid could be "general assistance for
lawful means," by a finding that: (a) the
sole purpose of the assisted organization
is the commission of crimes; OR (b) the
accused "endorsed] a policy of assisting
the organization's crimes."
b.

Stani.sirho50

Invoking Tadi and Peri, the Trial
al Chamber
lnima
yin t
acquitted the
defendants of aiding and abetting war crimes on the grounds that "the Accused
were not physically present together with the Unit during these two operations,"
which allowed for the "reasonable conclusion that the Accused's assistance
was not specifically directed towards the commission of the crimes of murder,
deportation, forcible transfer, or persecution."' They could have been just as
easily "directed to establishing and maintaining Serb control over [large areas of
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina]
Attempting faithfully to apply the "endorsement" prong of the Petie
framework, and recalling evidence introduced as to the military (rather than
paramilitary) character of the defendants' training of the Red Berets, a majority of
the Appeals Chamber judges could not conclude that the only reasonable
inference from the evidence concerning Stani6's actions was that he shared the
intent to remove forcibly and permanently non-Serbs from these areas." In other
words, the court in its actus reus inquiry looked to specific direction "in assessing
whether [defendants' assistance] had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crimes," and, with the exception of the dissenting Judge Picard, found a lack of

50

Staniiic Judgment, supra note 1.

s1

Id. 2360.

52

Id

s3

Id.
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specific intent to dictate a finding of no substantial effect.54 Thus, aiding and
abetting liability could not attach to the defendants' acts of assistance because (a)
they were not geographically proximate to the principals' crimes; nor were they
specifically directed, because (b) evidence of defendants' intent did not support a
finding of substantialeffect (nor, presumably, "endorsement" of the Bosnian Serb
Army's crimes), and (c) the military objectives of the Army were not solely and
exclusively the commission of crimes punishable under the ICTY Statute.
Perhaps because it concretized the sort of jurisprudence specific direction
requires, Stanigi6 sparked strong reactions, yet the outcome was hardly surprising
in light of Perisi.i
More to the point, Stanisid demonstrates that the lower
chambers of the ICTY regard as established law the Tadid dictum, adopted in
Peris?, requiring a stand-alone finding of specific direction for the prosecution to
prove the actus reus of complicity.
III. CONSISTENCY OF THE DOCTRINE
Evaluating the consistency of the PerisI/Stanise line of cases, in which
specific direction has been invigorated as a stand-alone actus reus proof element,
necessarily requires a referent: consistent with respect to what? The two referents
this Comment explores are (a) international treaty and case law and (b) the ICTY's
own case law.
A. With International Treaty and Case Law
Because a UN resolution established the ICTY, the Secretary-General had
only the authority to announce that the tribunal's statute was meant to "codify
existing norms of customary international law" and to submit suggestions received
from States about rules of procedure and evidence to tribunal judges for

5

5

Id. To satisfy the majority's insistence on proof of specific direction, Judge Picard would have used
the "implicit" route enunciated in the Blagojevil Appeals Judgment, supranote 31, whereby aid that
is practical and substantial is presumptively "specifically directed." See id. 2405 (J. Picard,
dissenting) (expressing distaste for the "overly restrictive" character of the Periijurisprudence, but
nonetheless arguing that "the 'specific direction' requirement can be inferred from the Accused's
actions").
See, for example, Gordy, supra note 4; Kenneth Roth, A Tribunal's Legal Stumble, N.Y. TIMEs (July
9,
2013),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/global/a-tribunals-legalstumble.html (last visited May 3, 2014); Marko Milanovic, The limits ofAiding andAbetting liability:
The ICIY Appeals Chamber Acquits Momilo Perisic, EUR. J. OF INT'L L. BLOG (March 11, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-limits-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-chamberacquits-momcilo-perisic/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
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discretionary adoption." Put differently, the statute charges the tribunal with
prosecuting war crimes and the like but does not provide culpability standards or
guidance as to the weight to accord different forms of proof." Concerning
derivative liability of accomplices, it provides only that criminal responsibility be
imposed individually on any person "who aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation, or execution" of any of the relevant crimes." Despite this statutory
paucity, the ICTY has incorporated some extant laws expressly, such as the ILC's
1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("Draft
Code"), which it deemed "an authoritative international instrument" and which
closely tracks a traditional complicity doctrine based on substantiality of aid.o
Further, judges have looked to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) for substantiation, doing so even before it entered into force.61
This does not mean, however, that judges invoke these authorities free from
confusion. For instance, the Tadit Appeals Chamber agreed with the FurundgJja
Trial Chamber's assessment of the Draft Code as authoritative, and it also cited
with approval that earlier court's description of the Rome Statute as of "significant
legal value." 62 Yet it then proclaimed these instruments' formulation of accomplice
liability-although good law, rightly embraced in Furund! ia, and consistent with
the proper authority of the court-"distinct from aiding and abetting."'6 While
the lack of concrete prescriptions of substantive law may not appear inherently
problematic, it becomes so in the presence of inconsistent outcomes in factually
apposite cases and when peer institutions-sharing or incorporating relevant law
56

The U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). See also ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 15;
this Comment's discussion, supra.

57

See generaly ICTY Statute, supranote 9.

58

Id. art. 7.1.

59

See Cassel, supra note 30, at 307 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals
Judgment, 227 (uly 21, 2000) [hereinafter Furundzija Appeals Judgment]).

6

The Draft Code imposes criminal responsibility on an individual who "knowingly aids, abets or
otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission [of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or genocide], including providing the means for its commission." Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Securiy ofMankind, (1996) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, arts. 2(3)(d), 17, 18, 20, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1 996/Add.l (Part II), availableat http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/draft/ 20articles/7_4_1996.pdf.

61

See, for example, Tadi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 18, T 223 (ICTY); Taylor Appeals Judgment,
supra note 8, T 383, n.1208 (listing as authorities the Rome Statute and the Genocide, Torture, and
Geneva Conventions) (SCSL).

62

Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 18,1223.

63

Id. T 221.
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and prosecuting the same crimes-sharply diverge on the issue.' The SCSL, for
example, recently convicted Charles Taylor for aiding and abetting war crimes
committed in Sierra Leone." The case is important to the analysis here because it
both signals the SCSL's understanding that it shares a space under customary
international law with the ICTY, and underscores specific direction's novelty and
potential affront to retributive goals."
The SCSL Trial Chamber's opinion in Taylor eschews specific direction or
any heightened actus reus standard, despite citing heavily to ICTR and ICTY
precedent for the proposition that settled international law controlled the actus
reus issue between and regardless of fora." With respect to aiding and abetting, that
court perceived the relevant law to be sufficiently codified in the Rome Statute
and applied in Mrkii and Furundgga.Indeed, the SCSL Trial Chamber cited to the
Perisil trial judgment to define the two requirements for finding an accused guilty
of aiding and abetting: "(i) the Accused provided practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support to the perpetration of a crime or underlying
offence and (ii) such practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support had a
substantial effect upon the commission of a crime or underlying offence."" Until
2013, then, not only did the ICTY perceive the relevant Tadi language as dictum
(or otherwise non-binding), but so too the SCSL Rejecting the notion that
geographic proximity has any bearing on actus reus, the SCSL invoked Peris??as a
foil position for its own, finding no "cogent reasons to depart from its holding
that the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability .. . is that the accused's acts and
conduct ... had a substantial effect on the commission of each charged crime for
which he is to be held responsible."" It emphatically concluded its analysis with
the absolutist stance "that 'specific direction' is not an element of the actus reus of

64

It becomes troubling not just for reasons of fair notice, but because of disruption to international
comity, to the accused's repose, to retributive justice norms and goals, etc.

65

For an argument that the facts in Periilwere identical to those in Taylor, see Manuel Ventura, Guest
Post: What the Jl YAppeaJudgment in PeriliMeansfortheSCSL Appeals Chamberin Taylor, SPREADING
THE JAM (March 11, 2013), http://dovjacobs.com/2013/03/11/guest-post-what-the-icty-appealjudgment-in-perisic-means-for-the-scsl-appeals-chamber-in-taylor/ (last visited May 3, 2014).

6

Note that the SCSL Statute differs somewhat from the others' in that it directs the Appeals
Chamber, when not interpreting Sierra Leonean law, to "be guided by the decisions of the Appeals
Chamber of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda." SCSL Statute,
supra note 13, art. 20(3). If anything, this makes the Taylor court's rejection of Perii even more
notable, just as it casts further aspersions on the wisdom of specific direction.

67

See Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial judgment,
18, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment].

68

Id. 11 482-86.

69

See Taylor Appeals Judgment, supranote 7, T 481.
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aiding and abetting liability under Article 6(1) of the Statute or customary
international law.' 70
Inconsistency with the law of peer tribunals is at least noteworthy and at
most problematic, given similarities in time, docket, and jurisdiction." Also of
note is the further irreconcilability of specific direction with ICTR case law; just
as the SCSL's direct rejection of specific direction erodes its consistency and
appeal, so too are ICTR cases concerning remote assistance to principal
perpetrators seemingly irreconcilable with the jurisprudence underlying Perifii and
Stani.72

Were these tribunals faced with a binary choice between following canonical
post-World War II decisions or those of peer UN Security Council tribunals, the
latter course would seem sounder. The ICTR, after all, was established and
operates in near identical fashion to the ICTY-under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.7 3 Further, the Security Council, suggesting a certain equivalence among
these three tribunals, granted the Secretary-General power to determine "whether
the special court could receive, as necessary and feasible, expertise and advice
from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda."74 Only the SCSL Statute mentions the other tribunals, but even it does
not circumscribe the authority accorded them; all punish the same crimes,
incorporate customary law, and define offenses with reference to the same
treaties." These circumstances, combined with the fact that the statutes of these
70

Id

71

See,for example, Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, Comments and Notes, The Emerging
Recognition of UniversalCiviljuisdiction,100 AM.J. INT'L L. 142, 143 (2006) (describing, as the modem
rationale for universal criminal jurisdiction, the fact that some crimes are so heinous that every state
has an interest in prosecuting them, while also discussing the emergence of universal civil
jurisdiction); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universalfurisdictionfor InternationalCrimes: HistoricalPerspectivesand
Contemporary Practice,42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 137 (2001) (defining "pure" universal jurisdiction as the
exercise of jurisdiction over a perpetrator who has no contacts with the forum state).

72

SeeJor example, Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Trial Chamber I (Dec. 3, 2003)
(holding a radio station liable for inciting genocide); Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 96-13A, Appeals Chamber (Nov. 16, 2001) (extending accomplice responsibility to a corporate director
of a tea factory for his role in Rwandan genocide and attendant crimes against humanity).

73

See Resolution 827, supra note 10 (chartering the ICTY under Chapter VII powers); accordS.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (J.C.T.R.)
[hereinafter Resolution 9551; accord S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, Emer. Sess., 4186th mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (S.C.S.L.) [hereinafter Resolution 1315].

74

Resolution 1315, supra note 73,

75

It instructs the SCSL only "to be guided by" the decisions of the other Appeals Chambers, not to
be bound by it. See the explanation in note 66, supra.

76

8(d).

See generally ICTY Statute, supra note 9; ICTR Statute, supra note 12; SCSL Statute, sepra note 13.
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tribunals often incorporate law only by reference, undoubtedly lead to confusion
as to the source and weight of precedent." Yet in a broad sense, these institutions
clearly perceive a de facto relationship of shared authority, as suggested by the
manner in which the Tayor appellate opinion speaks directly to and rejects Periis.C8
B. With ICTY Case Law
Before Penit and Stanis"t, the general practice among judges and scholars
was to overlook the Tadi complicity language entirely and invoke the case solely
as a conspiracy, or joint criminal enterprise, case.79 For example, Professor James
G. Stewart has canvassed international complicity case law and found that, prior
to the Tadid judgment, there was only one reference to specific direction; that in
over 98 percent of all aiding and abetting cases, specific direction is either not
mentioned at all or referenced casually in a single sentence, unelaborated, and
unapplied; and that, prior to Perisit, there were no acquittals either nationally or
internationally on the basis of specific direction." Judges were not alone in
disregarding the complicity formulation in TadiW. Doug Cassel, in a thoughtful
2009 article on corporate liability for aiders and abettors, wrote that "there is little
controversy in international criminal law that the actus reus [of aiding and
abetting] . . . consists of rendering 'practical assistance, encouragement, or moral

support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."' 1 This
accord between judicial and scholarly perspective finds support in a sensible
reading of international case law, which is notably silent on, or takes a decidedly
antithetical posture toward, limiting the actus reus of accomplice liability.

77

In the ICTY context, see The Secretary-General, Report, supra note 56, 29 (stating that the ICTY
statute was intended to "codify existing norms of customary international law"); Resolution 827,
supra note 10, 3. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 11-34 (establishing detailed procedural
rules governing the structure of the Chambers, qualifications and appointment of judges, appeal
rights, reporting, etc.), with ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 2-10 (describing as substantive law only
the Geneva Convention of 1949, the "laws and customs of war," and "international humanitarian
law'.

78

See Taylor Appeals Judgment, supra note 8,
considering it an affront).

79

See, for example, Furundzija Appeals Judgment, supra note 59, 1 119 (rejecting an appeal from a
convicted co-perpetrator on grounds that Tadiddoes not require "a plan, design, or purpose to have
been previously arranged or formulated").

so

See James G. Stewart, "Specific Direction" Is Unprecedented: Results from Two EmpiricalStudies, EUR. J. OF
INT'L L. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/specific-direction-is-unprecedented-resultsfrom-two-empirical-studies/ (last visited April 28, 2014).

81

Cassel, supra note 30, at 308 (grounding this assertion in the "widely cited language of the ICTY Trial
Chamber Judgment in Fund'a");accordStewart, supra note 80 (highlighting also the absence of
references to specific direction in academic literature).

481-82 (explicitly addressing recent ICTY law and
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In addition to cases already discussed, consider the 2009 case of Prosecutorv.
Mrki, 82 in which the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the proposition that
specific direction is a stand-alone element of aiding and abetting for the
prosecution to prove at trial. Citing employment of that phrase in Tadid as
inessential to the court's holding, the Mrkfid court invalidated the defendant's
invocation of that case. "The Appeals Chamber," it wrote, "has confirmed that
'specific direction' is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and
abetting."83 To the defendant's argument in the alternative that aiding and abetting
ought to entail a heightened mens rea showing, the Appeals Chamber responded
that it "has previously rejected an elevated mens rea requirement for aiding and
abetting, namely, the proposition that the aider and abettor needs to have intended
to provide assistance, or as a minimum, accepted that such assistance would be a
possible and foreseeable consequence of his conduct."84 When the Peri6 court
dismissed the Mrkid court's reasoning, it therefore contravened two holdings of
the latter court. It instituted a requirement of specific direction, of course, but by
merging mens rea with actus reus, it also erected a heightened mens rea showing
for the prosecution to surmount.85
The landmark Brdanin case, discussed supra, bolsters this reading of
customary international law. There, the Appeals Chamber held that the trial
court's finding of substantial effect on the commission of torture "equally applies
to an assessment of Brdanin's actus reus for the crime of aiding and abetting wilful
[sic] killing in camps and detention facilities."" That court stressed that "no
distinction can be drawn between mistreatment resulting in torture and
mistreatment resulting in death, since some detainees died as a result of the torture
they suffered in the camps and detention facilities." This statement elides a
reductionist problem specific direction faces: how to treat acts that might be
specifically directed to further a common criminal design yet have a substantial
result on the perpetration of even more serious crimes.

82

Prosecutor v. Mrkgi6, Case No. IT-95-13/1 -A, Appeals Judgment (May 5, 2009) [hereinafter Mrkgi
Appeals Judgment].

83

Id.

159 (citing Blagojevid Appeals Judgment, supra note 31).

84

Id

85

86

The Perili court argued that Mrkif treated specific direction only "in passing" and not with the sort of
"careful consideration" necessary to justify departure from Tadi. See Periiid Appeals Judgment, supra
note 42, IT 33-34. Yet the Tadit court devoted roughly the same page space to propounding specific
direction, citing no authority for actus reus restrictions. Compare Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 18,
229, with Mrkii Appeals Judgment, supra note 82, 159. SeeJenks, Perik(i, supra note 49, at 623.
Brdanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 40, T 452.

87

Id.
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IV. NORMATIVE EVALUATION
As an attempt to limit the potential class of defendants who may be held
criminally responsible for aiding and abetting, specific direction might have some
merit. A sound answer to the question of whether the test's merits outweigh its
demerits or mitigate concerns about its departure from case law, entails two
inquiries: first, whether the system of "common-law" criminal jurisprudence that
has produced specific direction is sound; second, whether the ICTY's specific
direction requirement is defensible in itself. This Comment briefly touches on the
first inquiry but, in light of the given fact of judge-made criminal law in this
context, devotes the bulk of its analysis to the second.
A. Process Concerns
Doubtless, many observers are uncomfortable with imposition of criminal
punishment without prescriptions from an authoritative institution as to the
weight of evidence, the sufficiency of proof, and the elements of the offense. Too
robust a rate of conviction smacks of "victor's justice"; an anemic prosecutorial
or judicial apparatus, on the other hand, likely means problematic under-inclusion.
In tribunals that proceed on the basis of universal jurisdiction, little codified law
controls; an accused individual may be convicted if he violates "a rule of
international humanitarian law," whether treaty-based or customary/decisional."
Before World War II, codification would have been indispensable and
incorporation of international law (whether by reference or otherwise)
meaningless: states were thought competent to discipline their own citizens, and
crimes committed by a government against its people were not punishable under
international law until the Nuremburg trials." That the customary law of
derivative liability is often culled from Nuremburg or other post-World War II
cases90 invites the question of what shared treaty or statutory law ought to control.
The closest thing to shared statutory law is the body of international treaties
and conventions criminalizing certain forms of activity: for example, the 1946
88

Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1 -A, Appeals Judgment,

89

See Anna Triponel, Business and Human Rights Law: Diverging Trends in the United States and France, 23
Am. U. INT'l L. REV. 855, 857-58 (2008); Evo Popoff, Note, Inconsistency and Impunity in International
Human Rights Law: Can the InternationalCriminalCourt Solve the Problems Raisedby the Rwanda andAugusto
Pinochet Cases?, 33 GiEo. WASH. INT'L L. Ri-v. 363, 366 (2001) (arguing that many of the problems
the Allies faced in attempting to legitimize the Nuremburg Tribunals flowed from the fact that
international law had not theretofore recognized crimes committed by a sovereign against its own
subjects).

90

See, for example, Tadid Appeals Judgment, supra note 18,
196-220, 229 (citing only pre-1950 cases
as decisional authority in deriving the customary forms of joint criminal enterprise liability, and then
citing no cases whatsoever in deriving culpability formulations for complicity).
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Genocide Convention," the 1949 Geneva Convention,9 2 the 1984 Torture
Convention, 93 the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombing. 94 In light of scant substantive guidance in the operating statutes, which
incorporate the crimes defined in those treaties but simultaneously allow
deference to national standards and suggestions, tribunal judges effectively
possess wide latitude to craft the applicable law by decision. Even the
International Criminal Court, empowered by universal jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes of international law wherever they occur, has not taken substantive
definition of international crimes out of the hands of individual judges.9'
Tribunal judges are tasked, therefore, with applying customary law gleaned
from mid-century cases to unique, contemporary facts, while bearing in mind
suggestions from the UN Secretary-General, generally adhered-to national
criminal law doctrine, and meritorious suggestions or proposals from national
actors. This is no easy task. But whether this system of what amounts to judgemade criminal law is justifiable or normatively salvageable is a question for another
paper.96 Depending on one's temporal or teleological conception of these

91

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. I, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (defining genocide as a crime under international law and obligating the parties
to "prevent and punish" it, but cabining the duty to prosecute genocide to the forum in which it
occurred).

92

See I.C.R.C. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977:
Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions and Successions as of 31 December 1993, 10 (1993)
(grounding universal jurisdiction over individuals in the right and obligation of all nations, not just
signatories, to prosecute and extradite those suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
genocide).

93

See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (obligating all parties to make torture an offense
under nationallaw and adding it to the list of violations for which parties are obligated to extradite;
refusing to clarify, however, how parties to the Convention might structure their national torture
statutes).

94

See Tadid Appeals Judgment, supra note 18,
authority, the Terrorist Bombing Treaty).

95

This is largely because ICC jurisdiction is hybridized, bestowing preference to adjudicate first on a
state with a traditional interest in prosecuting the crime (that is, the state where it occurred or the
state whose citizen perpetrated it). See Rome Statute, supra note 7, pmbl. & art. 17. See also Cassel,
supra note 30, at 316. Jurisdiction vests in the ICC via the principle of complementarity only when
such a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute the violator.

96

It might examine, for example, whether circumstances exist in international law that reduce the
concerns about notice, lenity, over-inclusion, and expostfacto laws that have motivated a trend away
from common-law crimes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain, and the US It might
also examine whether the undesirable sociological consequences of common-law crimes in Western
countries, see generally Michael J. Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law PersonalCrimes, 43
AM. Socio. REv. 93 (Feb. 1978) (arguing that the very lack of a statutory apparatus has led to far
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tribunals, a system of common law jurisprudence could be beneficial or
destructive-beneficial, because such back and forth exchanges between courts
might in the long run develop sound doctrine, but destructive if one thinks the
purpose of these tribunals is to predictably and consistently remedy evils through
generally accepted principles of treaty and case law.
This Comment suggests only that the ease with which the ICTY jettisoned
prevailing actus reus and causation formulations and distorted internal and
external precedent, elides the peril of a legal system that demands fealty neither to
codified culpability requirements nor a hierarchical authority structure. Reducing
the risk of under-conviction and under-prosecution requires either a statutory
overhaul geared towards concrete and comprehensive codification of culpability
requirements, or at least clear guidance as to the weight and incorporative value
of national doctrine, international treaties, and sister tribunal case law." For our
purposes, it is enough to note that even if concerns about over-inclusive common
law prosecutions are less relevant in the international sphere," the ICTY's specific
direction standard makes the opposite mistake: it is under-inclusive.
B. Specific Direction
Irrespective of setting or forum, aiding and abetting is often poorly suited to
proof by direct evidence, a realization reflected in the ICTY's relatively low mens
rea threshold of knowledge (that acts of assistance in fact facilitate the principal's
violations)." Yet there are also as-applied problems with the way it has demanded
more prosecutions of blacks than whites for common-law crimes), are somehow attenuated in the
international context.
9

For an argument that the jurisprudence of the ICTY reflects a basic philosophical uncertainty about
whether to establish coercive central institutions or refrain from a sanction-based system of
international law, see generally Lucas W. Andrews, Comment, Sailing around the Flat Earth: The
InternationalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslaia as a FailureofJurisprudentialTheory, 11 EMORY INT'L. L.
Rgv. 471 (Fall 1997).

98

In the international context, an accused's acts might necessarily meet some threshold level of gravity
and invite sufficiently searching international scrutiny to lay to rest concerns about over-inclusion.
Since individuals are unlikely to be indicted in these tribunals in the absence of a critical evidentiary
mass, this argument might assert, a common-law approach to international tribunal jurisprudencenotwithstanding the problems of authority, confusion, and inconsistent application-is less
objectionable if erring on the side of breadth.

99

There is some debate about whether knowledge or intent is or ought to be the test in the context
of corporate complicity. See generally Cassel, supra note 30 (calling for clarification of the standard);
Matthew Lippmann, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The "Other Schindlers," 9 TEMP. INT'l.
& CoMP. L.J. 173 (1995). It should be noted, however, that the Rome Statute as amended heightens
the mens rea for accomplice liability, resolving the dispute between knowledge and intent by making
criminally responsible one who aids and abets "for the purpose of facilitating the commission" of
the crime. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 25(3)(c). The weight of the international case law, as
the ICTY seems to conceive it, requires only a knowledge standard for a complicity conviction. See,
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appellate review of the Trial Chamber's fact finding. Trial judges have not only
resisted the ex ante imposition of limitations on culpable forms of conduct but
have also witnessed specific direction take the place of, or serve as a proxy for,
substantial assistance, a fact-based inquiry on which the record of the trial court
controls.'" When the Appeals Chamber has acquitted for want of proof of specific
direction, it has supplanted the trial record-under the guise of de novo review of
an issue of law-with a shorter version of facts relevant to specific direction. In
Peufiii, for example, the Appeals Chamber reviewed the evidence de novo,
according little weight to the trial court's factual findings regarding the accused's
effective control and adopting instead "an alternative reasonable interpretation of
the record."101 "Consequently," one commentator observed, "an appeals
judgment of fewer than fifty pages now serves as the factual record instead of a
trial judgment of almost six hundred pages."l02 The ICTY claims as an
accomplishment establishing a record of the crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia, but "substituting appellate factual findings so disproportionately
inferior in scope and detail for the trial chamber's factual findings" eviscerates the
historical record.103
Even if we suspend everything up to this point, there is a real authority-based
objection to be levied against the on-off switch of geographic proximity the
standard prescribes. It seems inimical to prevailing, geographically neutral
conceptions of universal jurisdiction, to why the court is competent to hear
argument in these cases at all. After all, the ICC grounds its jurisdiction on the
assumption that another state will have a sufficient interest in prosecuting the
suspected war criminal if the state where the crime was committed is unwilling or
unable to do so.'04 The geographic proximity test is truly the low-hanging fruit of
specific direction, chiefly because the only role played by geography in the ICTY's
case law is to strengthen or weaken proof of mens rea, not define forms of
punishable activity.' Since the barriers of geographic proximity are not a factor

for example, Prosecutorv. Furund!gya, Case No. IT-95-17/1 -T, Trial Judgment,
1998).
1oo Blagojevi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 31,

218, 249 (Dec. 10,

1134.

101 Perigic Appeals Judgment, supra note 42,1 117.
102

Jenks, supra note 49, at 626.

103

Id.

1o4

See Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 12-14.
226-28, 430 (finding geography
relevant only to define the scope of the criminal purpose for conspiracy liability); accord Prosecutor
v. Stakik, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, f 64--67 (Mar. 22, 2006); accord Blagojevic
Appeals Judgment, supra note 31 (holding that the defendant's knowledge of criminal activities in a

105 See, for example, Brdanin Appeals Judgment, supra note 40,
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in the jurisdictional, let alone the substantive, analysis, how should we think about
the PeriEi court's distinction of prior holdings on a basis so increasingly
inconsequential in international law?
The geographic proximity prong of specific direction is not its only brightline aspect that poses problems. In his Perik dissent, Judge Liu foresaw many of
the complications endemic to the majority's decision, namely that it eradicated the
difference between liability as an accomplice and liability as a principal.'06 While a
favorable interpretation, on the other hand, would defend imposition of specific
direction as an attempt to fill an even more vexing void in the international law of
war crimes,tor arguments cutting the other way suggest that this incarnation of
such an attempt is unsatisfying.
Proponents argue that the ICTY's relatively lax mens rea requirement of
knowledge for aiding and abetting liability might, in the absence of some
limitation, criminalize a broad swath of routine international arms trading and
therefore needs a limiting principle.' One might look, for example, to the recent
crisis in Syria to ground the objection that the British government and the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, so long as they do everything in their power to assist
only "lawful" rebel actions, should not be held responsible for aiding and abetting
any international crimes their munitions dealing substantially and knowingly
facilitates.' Another version of the argument might assert that, while a consistent
legal standard that threatens over-inclusion comports with the realities of small or
marginal states (like those involved in the Yugoslav conflict), it threatens the
flexibility of more powerful states likely to be involved in future conflicts by
ignoring the layers of intervening bureaucracy that should serve to limit subjective
culpability.n1 0

town near Srebrenica was insuffident to support the conclusion that he knew of the crimes against
humanity perpetrated in Srebrenica).

106

SeeJenks, supra note 49, at 625 (citing Liu Dissent, supra note 49, 1 3 & n.9).

107 Tribunals often must strain for relevant guiding authority, and most have found and cited only the
Rome Statute when substantively defining crimes. See generaly Taylor Appeals Judgment, supra note
8 (rejecting ICTY precedent on point and citing instead ICC case law and the Rome Statute).
108

In contrast, it should be noted that the Rome Statute explicitly adopted a "purpose" mens rea for
most crimes of complicity. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 25.3(c).

109

For a proponent of this argument, see Kevin Jon Heller, Why the ICIY's 'S9ecficaly Directed'
Requirementisjusified, OPINIOJUIuS (June 2, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/
why-the-ictys-specifically-directed-requirement-is-justified (last visited May 8, 2014).

110 This might excavate accusations leveled in 2013 that "the US and Israeli governments applied
improper pressure on the tribunal to ensure military commanders could never be convicted of war
crimes." Owen Bowcott, Hague War Crimes Ruling Threatens to Undermine Future Prosecutions, THE
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A first response might argue that, even if some limitation is justified,
morphing mens rea into actus reus would provide an escape hatch, since an
accused violator operating at some geographic remove would in every conceivable
case point to state bureaucracy to undermine proof of mens rea. Indeed, a state
could easily erect defined and insular cadres within a military decision-making
apparatus, and indeed would even be incentivized to do so, thereby limiting the
potential for its officials to police misconduct ex ante or be found guilty ex post.
In any case, Perli1 might constitute a fairly singular case, failing "to concern a
single instance of remotely provided military assistance that was used by third
parties, unknowingly to the provider, to perpetrate crimes for which the provider
was then held liable."ll 2 (This assessment, however, contrasts markedly with
contemporaneous conceptions: the questions Presiding Judge Moloto put to the
prosecutor at Perific's trial implied that finding Periic guilty as an accomplice
would raise thorny questions about the complicity of NATO in unlawful
detentions at Guantanamo and crimes in Bagram and Kabul.11 3) But the more
persuasive objection to this argument is to impugn its premises. Besides
mandating acceptance of the notion that arms trading, and particularly weapons
exchanges with nations openly engaged in committing atrocities, is socially
valuable (or at least an activity for which there is a non-criminal, lawful purpose),
the argument does not exclude alternative approaches or explain why they would
not feasibly cabin responsibility. One could concede the equivalence of NATO's
and PerigiCs assistance yet still distinguish conviction m the latter case from
acquittal in the (hypothetical) former by recourse to a heightened mens rea
standard for complicity or to notions of proximate cause-or even some
combination of the two, as in the Model Penal Code.114

GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/aug/13/hague-

war-crimes-ruling-prosecutions-serb (last visited April 28, 2014).

1

Note that two judges hearing the Pefi appeal preferred specific direction to condition the mens
rea, not actus reus, of complicity for precisely this reason. See PeriditAppeals Judgment, supra note
1-3. Ultimately, however, they thought specific direction could
42 (JJ. Meron, Agius, concurring),
also "be reasonably assessed in the context of actus reus." Id. 4.

iJ

1

112 Jenks, Peili, supra note 49, at 625; but see Ventura, supra note 65 (arguing that the facts of Taylorand

Petiliwereidentical).
113

For a transcript of the judge's questions, see Ventura, supra note 65.

114

See ALI's Model Penal Code, which provides for a finding of complicity where the accomplice acts
with the purpose of furthering the principal's commission of crimes (§ 2.06(3)) or, distinguishing
between complicity in conduct (that is, forcible transfer) that causes a result-defined crime (that is,
genocide) and assisting the end crime itself, where the accused "acts with the kind of culpability, if
any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense" (5 2.06(6)). The
Code also prohibits from classification as an accomplice one who assists an offense defined such
that "his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission," which might in effectively causal terms
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Beyond process concerns in general, and beyond particular objections to
specific direction's geographic proximity test and propensity to erode the integrity
of the historical record of crimes, the weight of customary law suggests that the
mere fact of a large national bureaucracy should not condition the actus reus, at
least where assistance is substantial and a mens rea of knowledge proven. Adolf
Eichmann sought to defend on these grounds, and Germany was unquestionably
an industrialized state with varying cadres of involvement among party
functionaries. Eichmann's chief defense, which Hannah Arendt christened the
"banality of evil" argument," was that his actions did not amount either primarily
or derivatively to war crimes. They were, he argued, merely the sorts of actions
anyone in his position would undertake in the interests of staying employed,
actions not themselves suggestive of criminality (for example, pushing buttons,
signing authorizations, etc.)."'
The question on which his guilt turned was a common one in cases of duress:
whether orders from Hitler and the Nazis "disturb[ed] his conscience, so that he
acted under compulsion from which he saw no escape," or whether he acted "with
inner indifference like an obedient automaton," identifying implicitly with the
contents of orders."' If indifference would lead to guilt, then knowledge of the
substantial effect of one's actions on the perpetration of the crime(s) combined
with inaction would constitute indifference. Like Periic, Eichmann knew his
assistance facilitated the commission of grave crimes and failed to act, not because
of duress, but because of either indifference or internal agreement. Explicitly
rejecting Eichmann's defense, the Jerusalem District Court held that abdicating
one's conscience is not a defense to war crimes or crimes against humanity."'
Proponents of specific direction might respond to the above with the
suggestion that the prosecution ought to proceed under conspiracy rather than
aiding and abetting, so as to circumvent the "specific direction" requirement
altogether. Yet this is no answer, only mere avoidance, and the efficacy of such an
approach is doubtful. First, the defendants in Staniliiwere charged with conspiracy
insulate those who vend weapons to volatile states or factions. See generally David J. Karp, Note,
Causafion in the Model Penal Code, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1249 (Oct. 1978).
115

See general HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EviLi
(1963) (classifying the Eichmann trial as evidence that great evils of human history owe less to
fanatics or sociopaths and more to ordinary people who participated under the assumption that
their actions were normal).

116

Attorney General of the Gov't of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, Trial Judgment, 1 222, available at
http://www.trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user-upload/documents/trialwatch/eichmann-district.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Eichmann Trial Judgment].

117

Id.

118

See generally id.
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(participation in a joint criminal enterprise) in addition to aiding and abetting, and
the Trial Chamber acquitted them of those charges as well."' Second, conspiracy,
as the Tad Appeals Chamber held, requires a heightened showing of mens reaeither of specific intent or of intent to participate in some common criminal design
connected to the crimes.' 20 (Recall the suggestion, supra, that specific direction
effectively imported this heightened showing into the aiding and abetting context.)
As a matter of policy, and in contrast to plea bargaining where the accused admits
guilt, conviction for lesser offenses of those who do not admit guilt tends, in
general, to undermine respect for legal process, poorly retribute for victims, and
reduce deterrence at the margins (if violators know they can shield themselves at
least from complicity by steering clear of certain acts).12'
After Stanigi1, many chroniclers of international law argued that mandating a
stand-alone showing of specific direction where the alleged aiding and abetting
was not geographically near to the crimes' principal perpetration, "demands a type
of evidence that no major criminals have ever produced in any conflict:
documentation indicating specific instructions that crimes be committed."' 2 2
Requiring such a showing seems to swallow the purpose of accountability regimes
and even "lessen or confuse the ICTY's accomplishments in establishing a
historical record of war crimes in the Balkans in the 1990s."123 Criticizing specific
direction, one commentator even posed the question of whether the group of
German industrialists who sold to Nazis unprecedented amounts of the poison
gas used in concentration camps, would have been acquitted under such a proof

19

"[K]nowledge and acceptance of the risk that crimes would be committed lis] insufficient for the
first form of [joint criminal enterprise] liability." Stanigi6 Judgment, supra note 1, j 2332. Squaring
this with the Tadid holding regarding the third instantiation of conspiracy requires the tribunal to
find the risk of death other than "likely." See Tadic Appeals judgment, supra note 18, 229 (making
guilt, in the absence of specific intent, depend on intent to pursue the criminal design and
"foresight" that other crimes were "likely" to follow). But the Trial Chamber found that, even if
the crimes were reasonably foreseeable, the prosecution had not proven Staniiic's intent to pursue
the common criminal design, only his desire to "establish] and maintainf Serb control over large
areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina." Staniii6 Judgment, supra note 1, 2326.

120

See Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 18,

121

It is bound to be much harder to prove specific intent to perpetrate genocide than to show such
intent to participate in a shared scheme of, for example, deportation, which engendered purportedly
unforeseen atrocities. Suspected violators are unlikely to acknowledge this intent in any fixed
medium, and it is often unnecessary for those in positions of bureaucratic power to justify their
orders at all.

122

Gordy, suipra note 4. See Roth, supra note 55; Bowcott, supra note 110.

123

Jenks, Periid, supra note 49, at 624 (also asserting that the decision serves as a reminder of the "lack [of]
a coherent and consistent answer" in this area, even about "threshold questions on the elements of
forms of liability").
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standard.'24 In the famous case, known as Bruno Tesch,1 25 three corporate officers
argued that they supplied Zyklon B to Nazis for lawful extermination purposes.
While there were undoubtedly sanitary problems within concentration camps, the
justification rang hollow to the Hamburg Court.'2 6
Applying specific direction to the facts of Tesch, it is clear that the defendants'
geographic proximity would not meet the first prong of the test as applied in
Perisd, where a matter of several miles was insufficient to avoid the specific
direction inquiry.'27 Aid would, therefore, fulfill the actus reus proof requirement
only if Tesch's assistance were specifically directed, meaning: (1) the group assisted
was "an organization whose sole and exclusive purpose was the commission of
crimes"; or (2) the defendant "endorsed a policy of assisting [the group's]
crimes." 28 The endorsement prong was obviously susceptible to proof problems
and remains so today: private employers, as well as modern liberal governments,
are unlikely to utilize extensive monitoring and exploit technological innovations
in eavesdropping unless minimizing the "omnipresent, unquantifiable risk of
making a lower profit than . . . otherwise."'129 And because the Nazis were a
political party for whom the commission of crimes, however ubiquitous, was only
one objective among other, sometimes lawful ones, Tesch and his co-defendants
would presumably have been acquitted under Peisi. 1 o
Regardless of the hypothetical Tesch outcome, the susceptibility of heads of
state to criminal responsibility owes much to an abandonment of the presumption

124

See Stewart, Comments to Kevin Jon Heller, supra note 6.

125

See Case No. 9: The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, before The British
Military Court in Hamburg, Germany (March 1946), http://www.worldcourts.com/ildc/eng/
decisions/1946.03.08_UnitedKngdom-vTesch.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).

126

But considerWilliam B. Lindsey, Zyklon 8, AuschuitZ and Brmno Tesch, 4 J. HisT. Rtiv. 261, 263 (Fall
1983) (arguing that the case represents an instance of victor's or "new" justice and that Dr. Tesch's
conviction was unjustified).

127

Periiic Trial Judgment, supra note 45,
to Srebrenica).

128

Periiic Appeals Judgment, supra note 42,

129

Julie E. Cohen, Privay, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffry Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2032-33
(2001).

1-21 (describing the geographic proximity of the accused
52.

130 Besides carrying out the analogy, my only addition to Stewart's provocative argument about specific

direction applied to the Tesch case is to suggest that a creative specific direction court might have
found "endorsement" satisfied simply in the Herculean quantity of poison gas sold: it was surely
well out of proportion to any pest control sales Tesch and the others, or any legitimate enterprise,
had theretofore engaged in.
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that leaders' official activities always pursue a legitimate state purpose."' The case
against Augusto Pinochet supposedly constituted an effective end to the erstwhile
exemption they enjoyed.' 32 Under a specific direction-like standard, the higher up
in a state's hierarchy a suspected violator is, the harder it becomes for prosecutors
to prove an accused's endorsement of "a policy of assisting" crimes or provision
of support to an organization whose sole and exclusive purpose is the commission
of crimes."' Specific direction, then, seems normatively irreconcilable: with the
notion of the ICC and universal jurisdiction-that every state has an interest in
prosecuting war atrocities; with the need to criminalize aiding and abetting in large
and bureaucratic as well as small and insular states alike; with the Pinochet
command responsibility paradigm shift (that is, no one enjoys immunity by virtue
of his position within the state apparatus); with the need for enforcement to be
sufficiently effectual and frequent so as to carry a deterrent effect, however
marginal, on the commission of such crimes; and, finally-as a behavioral and
procedural consideration-with the need to elicit witness testimony.134
V. CONCLUSION
Hannah Arendt largely misread Eichmann, or perhaps she drew conclusions
too quickly on the basis of selective evidence."' Certainly, she made light of certain

131

See generally Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DuKiE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 415 (2000); MugambiJouet, Spain's Expanded Universal jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights
Abuses in Latin America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 495 (2006).

132

See Byers, supranote 131, at 416-18.

133

Even al-Qaeda is not solely and exclusively dedicated to unlawful activity, and US courts have
struggled with separating assistance or aid to lawful purposes from aiding and abetting terrorism.
See generaly Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).

134

Recent scholarship has described problems of intimidation and lack of witness anonymity in
international tribunals. See Andrew Trotter, Witness Intimidation in InternationalTrials:Balancingthe Need
for Protection against the Rgbts of the Accused, 44 Gio. WASH. INT'L L. Ri~v. 521, 522-25 (2012).
Increasing reluctance to testify has followed, and under-conviction would seem to exacerbate the
problem of witness incentives. But see Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, The Yugoslav Tnbunal: Use
of Unnamed Witnesses, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235 (1996) (arguing on grounds of due process against
withholding several witnesses' names from Tadi6 and his defense counsel).

135

For adherents of this view, see, for example, Lionel Abel, The Aesthetics of Evil: Hannah Arendt on
Eichmann and theJews, 30 PARTISAN REv. 211, 224 (Spring 1963) ("Arendt's judgment of Eichmann
as an insignificant and commonplace official will be seen to be perverse and arbitrary."); Gertrude
Ezorsky, Hannah Arendt Against the Facts, 2 NEW Pol. 52, 52-53 (1963) (quoting the results of a
psychiatric study, which found that Eichmann was "a man obsessed with a dangerous and insatiable
urge to kill," and thus concluding that "Arendt's tale that Eichmann was without fanatical hatred
of Jews seems initially implausible"); Michael A. Musmanno, Man with an Unspotted Conscience, N.Y.
TIMES (May 19, 1963) ("The disparity between what Miss Arendt states, and what the ascertained
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of his statements outside of court-for example, "I will gladly jump into my grave
in the knowledge that five million enemies of the Reich have already died like
animals"-in favor of his self-serving testimony.13 Yet her broader commentary
about human nature and her disabusing us of the belief that accomplices to serious
crimes constitute the Other, ring true and remain particularly relevant today. How
one evaluates Arendt's broader claim, irrespective of whether Eichmann was its
correct antecedent, might parallel one's impression of the ICTY's attempt to limit
the actus reus of accomplice liability so as to sweep in only acts of assistance that
overtly display an individual's culpability.
This Comment has implicitly taken her observation as meaningful and
maintained that, consonant with most Western complicity doctrine (but not
specific direction), assistance of war crime perpetrators is equally culpable
regardless of the observable form it takes-assuming the equality of other relevant
factors, such as knowledge and substantiality of aid. It has argued that specific
direction qua an importation of mens rea into actus reus is at odds with the
customary law of international treatises, conventions, and cases-a realization
borne out in responses, judicial and journalistic, to its intrusion onto the ICTY
landscape. Additionally, this Comment has assessed the normative consequences
of specific direction that, far from ameliorating or superseding these problems,
make specific direction still less desirable. In the way of immediate practical
application, it has suggested the need for the ICTY Appeals Chamber to clarify
aiding and abetting so as to bring it in line with customary law and the law of its
peers, reject the PeniE adoption of the Tadii dictum, re-consider the Peditcase, and
proceed in the Stanifid appeal to reverse on matters of law the Trial Chamber's
acquittal. 137

facts are, occurs with such disturbing frequency in her book that it can hardly be accepted as an
authoritative historical work.").
136

Quote drawn from David Cesarani, AdolfEichmnan: The Mind of a War Criminal,BBC NEWS SERv.
(Feb. 17, 2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/genocide/ eichmann_01
.shtml (last visited March 8, 2014).

137

Note that the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) will be tasked with
performing many of the functions of the ICTY, including appeals hearings and re-trials, once the
latter's mandate expires. Instructed to apply the law of the tribunal, MICT practitioners represent
another potential audience to whom this Comment may prove relevant.
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